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 Before this court is a petition for review by Yellow 
Freight System, Inc. ("Yellow Freight") asking us to set aside an 
order of the National Labor Relations Board finding violations of 
the National Labor Relations Act ("Act").  The Board has cross-
appealed for enforcement of its order.  Our jurisdiction is 
conferred by 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).  See Yellow Freight Systems, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 313 NLRB No. 15, (Nov. 24, 1993). 
 II.  Yellow Freight's Petition for Review 
 Yellow Freight's petition for review requires us to decide 
whether the Board's determination that John Mendez would have 
been hired as a regular employee of Yellow Freight but for his 
protected activity is supported by substantial evidence.  
 Yellow Freight is a unionized trucking company operating 
over six hundred terminals nationwide, including one in South San 
Francisco, California--the site of the alleged violations here.  
The Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local 85 
("Union") represents the truckdrivers and dock workers at the 
South San Francisco site.   
 Employees at Yellow Freight are classified as either 
"casual" or "regular" employees.  Regular employees are 
designated on a seniority list that grants them employment 
  
opportunities before other employees.  Casual employees are 
offered available work after the regular employees have received 
their assignments.  By working seventy (70) eight-hour shifts 
within six months, a casual employee can obtain "preferential" 
casual status.  This preferential status gives such employee 
priority over other casuals in regard to work assignments.  Under 
the local union agreement and National Master Freight Agreement, 
one casual employee is to be placed on the seniority list for 
each sixty-five vacation replacement days worked by a casual 
employee during each vacation quarter. 
 A casual employee is hired as a regular employee at Yellow 
Freight in a two-step process.  The first step consists of the 
on-site terminal manager's selecting a casual employee for that 
position.  The employee fills out a series of forms.  S/he takes 
a driver's written examination and a road test.   A background 
check is completed, and a physical examination is administered 
that includes an alcohol and drug test.  At the second step, 
these forms and the results of the examinations are sent to 
Yellow Freight's Human Resources Division in Tracy, California.  
This office decides whether the casual employee will be hired as 
a regular employee. 
 John Mendez, the individual grievant, is a member of the 
Union and is a "casual" employee of Yellow Freight.  He alleges 
that the conduct of Yellow Freight employees violated  
§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act when he was not hired as a regular 
employee because of his supervisor's alleged hostility toward the 
union and Mendez' association with it.  The ALJ and the NLRB 
  
agreed.  Yellow Freight counters that their finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence but even if there is a showing 
in the record that protected union conduct was a motivating 
factor in the employment decision by Yellow Freight, the same 
decision would have been made due to Mendez's poor driving 
record. 
 Before turning to these issues we consider our standard of 
review.  This court is not to overturn Board findings unless 
"there is no substantial evidence in the record, considered as a 
whole, to support them."  Tubari, Ltd. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 453 
(3d Cir. 1992); see 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).  According to the Supreme 
Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 
(1951),  
"[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.  
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."  
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 
(1938).  Accordingly, it "must do more than create a 
suspicion of the existence of the fact to be 
established. . . . it must be enough to justify, if the 
trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict 
when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one 
of fact for the jury."  Labor Bd. v. Columbian 
Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). 
 
 
 Mendez's grievance arises out of the actions of his 
supervisors, Michael Bloss and Mark Graybill, at the South San 
Francisco terminal.  He alleges that these supervisors made 
statements and acted in a manner that constituted discriminatory 
conduct toward him as a result of anti-union animus and that such 
actions and attitudes were motivating factors in his not being 
considered for a regular position.  The ALJ and the Board so 
  
found.  Yellow Freight argues before us that the finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence.  We turn to that issue.        
    
 Before the Board, Mendez charged that Yellow Freight 
violated § 8(a)(1)(3) of the Act.  Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 
proscribes as "unfair labor practices" acts of employers that 
"interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."  29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1).  Section 8(a)(3) defines "unfair labor practice" as 
an act by an employer that is motivated by "discrimination in 
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition 
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization."  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 
 In determining whether an employer's decision to deny an 
employee advancement constitutes an unfair labor practice under 
§§ 8(a)(1)(3) of the Act, the General Counsel bears the burden of 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that protected conduct 
was a motivating factor in the employer's decision.  Compare D & 
D Distrib. Co. v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 636, 641 (3d Cir. 1986).  
General Counsel, on behalf of Mendez, presented witnesses who 
testified to certain conduct by Yellow Freight employees that the 
ALJ and Board held violative of the Act.  The testimony from 
these Yellow Freight witnesses involved, inter alia, several 
statements made by Bloss and Graybill about Mendez's use of the 
union grievance procedure to complain of working conditions and 
work assignments.    
  
 Bloss apparently became aware from a dispatcher that 
Mendez was making complaints to the union concerning his work 
shifts.  Yellow Freight's Br., Exh. A at 10-11.  Bloss was heard 
to state that Mendez had developed "an attitude problem."  Id.  
Mendez communicated his complaints to Raymond Cozzette, a Yellow 
Freight employee who acted as the Union's Chief Shop Steward.  
Cozzette was characterized as a zealous union official who filed 
"a lot of grievance [sic] on behalf of the unit employees."  Id. 
at 11 ¶1.  Bloss testified that he considered Cozzette a 
"troublemaker" and that he had communicated that sentiment 
publicly.  Id. at ¶2.   
 During Mendez's second interview for the position of 
regular employee, Bloss asked Mendez "what had [he] thought about 
the Union?"  Id. at 12 ¶2.  After the question was asked, Bloss 
then proceeded to give Mendez his views on the Union and the 
collective bargaining agreement and offered Mendez a suggestion 
that he should stop hanging around the "wrong people."  Id.  
Bloss was also heard to tell a union shop steward that he did not 
intend to hire Mendez because of his alleged attitude problem and 
association with "troublemakers" and that he "was just go[ing] 
through the motions of interviewing Mendez."  Id. at 16 ¶1.   
 Based on the foregoing record, we conclude that the 
finding of the ALJ and the Board that Yellow Freight's decision 
not to advance Mendez for protected conduct was supported by 
substantial evidence. 
 As an affirmative defense, Yellow Freight offered 
testimony from Mark Kirkpatrick, the Manager of the Human 
  
Resources Department, that even if Mendez had been suggested for 
a regular employment position, he would have been rejected under 
the company's April 1990 policy1 in regard to moving violations.  
See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., above.  Mendez and 
the Union countered that one or both of the terminal supervisors, 
Bloss and/or Graybill, knew of Mendez's driving record.  Despite 
their knowledge of the violations on his record, on several 
occasions they assured Mendez and union representatives Cozzette 
and Charles McLin that Mendez was still being considered for a 
regular position.  Id. at 25-27.  Not only was the April 1990 
policy not applied at the outset of the hiring process, but 
Mendez was given a background check, drug/alcohol test, physical 
                     
1
.  The April 24, 1990 policy issue by Yellow Freight's vice-
president for human resources reads in pertinent part as follows: 
Effective immediately, three key requirements for road 
drivers . . . have been changed.  Use these 
requirements when you screen applicants for driver 
positions: 
 . . . . 
 Reject: an applicant with any one of these records: 
  
 . . . . 
 - A moving violation in the last 12 months. 
 - More than one moving violation[] in the last 13-24 
months. 
 
 . . . . 
 
Applicants must meet these revised requirements, as 
well as the other current requirements you're familiar 
with -- license, driving ability, and physical 
condition.  If you have any questions about the driver 
requirements, please check with your Human Resource 
office . . . . 
Yellow Freight's Br., Exh. A at 23-24. 
    This policy was sent from the human resources office to all 
of Yellow Freight's terminal managers and supervisors. 
  
examination and a personal interview in preparation for his 
application to the position of regular employee.  Id. at 1 (NLRB 
Decision & Order).  Finally, it is apparent the company was not 
enforcing the policy because, despite Mendez's moving violations, 
he was employed as a casual driver and at no time had he been 
denied employment by Yellow Freight.  Id. at 4 n.4.2 
 Based on his credibility determinations of the witnesses 
presented, the ALJ concluded that Yellow Freight had failed to 
meet its rebuttal burden.  First, the ALJ rejected Bloss' 
testimony attempting to refute the allegations made by Mendez and 
the Union "in its entirety" stating that his "demeanor was poor" 
and the "lack of corroboration" of his testimony.  Id. at 22 ¶4.  
While he rejected Bloss' testimony, the ALJ credited the 
testimony given by Cozzette, McLin and Cozzette's successor, 
Holland, in regard to the actions taken by Yellow Freight 
employees.  Second, the ALJ rejected Kirkpatrick's testimony 
citing his "poor demeanor," id. at 27 ¶3, and "conclusionary 
testimony which was devoid [of] any kind of specificity,"  id. at 
¶2.  Kirkpatrick did not provide the ALJ with any documentary 
evidence that he or his office had vetoed any applicant based on 
the April 1990 policy.  As a result of the lack of supporting 
evidence and corroboration, the ALJ refused to accept 
Kirkpatrick's conclusion that Mendez would have been rejected, in 
                     
2
.  Mendez was hired as a casual employee prior to the new 
policy's adoption and thus it was not considered when he was 
initially hired by Yellow Freight.  The policy, however, does not 
distinguish between regular and casual drivers.  
  
any event, under the April 1990 policy.  In addition to 
Kirkpatrick's testimony, the ALJ credited the testimony of Bloss 
and Graybill to the extent that it contradicted Kirkpatrick's 
testimony. 
 The Board agreed with the ALJ that Yellow Freight violated 
§ 8(a)(1)(3) of the Act when it failed to hire Mendez as a 
regular employee solely because he engaged in activity that is 
protected by the Act.  It further held that Yellow Freight had  
not carried its affirmative defense that it would not have 
employed him as a regular employee in any event. 
   Because we conclude that there is substantial evidence 
to support the Board's ruling, we will deny Yellow Freight's 
petition for review and enforce the Board's order to the extent 
it granted relief to Mendez.3 
 III.  The Board's Cross-Application for Enforcement of its Order 
 The Board's cross-application also asks us to enforce its 
order to the extent it found that Yellow Freight violated § 
8(a)(1) of the Act because its South San Francisco terminal 
manager and a supervisor warned employees that they would be 
                     
3
.  The remedy ordered by the ALJ for this alleged violation 
included:  Mendez's placement on the seniority list or in a 
substantially similar position; removing any indication from his 
records regarding the unlawful refusal to hire him; and finally, 
making Mendez whole by providing him with any back pay or 
benefits and other damages to make up for any loss incurred as a 
result of the unlawful refusal to hire.  Yellow Freight Br., Exh. 
A at 47. 
  
terminated if they walked off the job in violation of Yellow 
Freight's National Master Freight Agreement with the Union.4 
 The alleged violation involves the actions of supervisors 
Bloss and Mike Vega toward Union Agent Terry Hart.  At the time 
of the incident, Hart was at the South San Francisco terminal 
discussing pending grievances with approximately fifteen drivers.  
Bloss asked Hart to leave the premises, citing his disruption of 
the workplace.  Hart refused to leave and Bloss called the 
police.  When the police arrived, they were taken to a room where 
Hart was meeting with the drivers.  Hart attempted to rally the 
workers to strike.  Bloss informed several employees that if they 
joined Hart in a strike they would be deemed to have quit their 
positions because they were on the clock and would thus be 
abandoning their jobs.  Hart again attempted to generate a 
walkout.  Both Bloss and Vega again told the drivers of the 
possibility of termination.  Hart finally acquiesced and told the 
drivers to remain on the job. 
 The question raised by the Union's allegation is whether 
Yellow Freight's employees, Bloss and Vega, interfered with and 
restricted protected activity contrary to § 8(a)(1) of the Act.  
More explicitly, the issue is whether Hart's actions were 
                     
4
.  The Board adopted the Order of the ALJ in regard to this 
issue.  The ALJ Order requires that Yellow Freight "[c]ease and 
desist from: . . . [t]hreatening employees with immediate 
discharge if they engage in an unauthorized work stoppage, where 
the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and [Yellow 
Freight] grants the employees immunity from discharge for the 
first 24 hours of participation in such unauthorized activities."  
Yellow Freight Br., Exh. A at 48. 
  
protected activity under the Union's collective bargaining 
agreement with Yellow Freight.5 
 The Board held that Hart's activity was protected and thus 
concluded that Bloss and Vega violated the Act when they 
interfered.  The Board so concluded even though it recognized 
that our court had held that when a contract with a no-strike 
provision exists, a strike is not protected activity.  Food Fair 
Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1974).  It refused to 
follow our decision.  
 In Food Fair an employer terminated "casual drivers" who 
engaged in a walkout in violation of their collective bargaining 
agreement.  The discharged employees argued that the provision 
limiting the employer's options for discipline created an 
exception to the no-strike provision.  The Food Fair court 
rejected that argument and held that the employer's decision to 
                     
5
.  The relevant provision of the collective bargaining agreement 
authorizes the employer to take certain actions when there is an 
unauthorized work stoppage.  The provision recites: 
[T]he Employer, during the first twenty-four (24)-hour 
period of such unauthorized work stoppage in violation 
of this Agreement, shall have the sole and complete 
right of reasonable discipline, including suspension 
from employment, up to and including thirty (30) days, 
but short of discharge, and such employees shall not be 
entitled to or have any recourse to the grievance 
procedure . . . .  After the first  twenty-four (24)-
hour period of an unauthorized stoppage in violation of 
this Agreement, and if such stoppage continues, the 
Employer shall have the sole and complete right to 
immediately further discipline or discharge any 
employee participating in any unauthorized strike, 
slowdown, walkout, or any other cessation of work in 
violation of this Agreement, and such employees shall 
not be entitled to or have any recourse to the 
grievance procedure. 
  
terminate the employees after only 18 hours on the picket line 
was not an unfair labor practice. 
 The reasoning of the Food Fair court was that these types 
of strikes violate the no-strike provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements and are therefore not protected activities 
under § 7 of the Act.  Because these strikes are not protected 
activities, the court held that immediate discharge of such 
employees did not constitute an unfair labor practice.  Id. at 
395. 
 The Board in this case suggests adherence to the Board's 
decision in Wagoner Transportation Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 452, 
enforced per curiam, 424 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1970), holding that 
despite the no-strike clause, a wildcat strike that lasted less 
than 24 hours was a protected activity under § 7 of the Act.  
However, in Food Fair our court considered the Wagoner rationale 
and holding and specifically rejected them.  Food Fair, 491 F.2d 
at 396. 
 The Board does not suggest that Food Fair is 
distinguishable in principle.  Thus, it does not contend that our 
Internal Operating Procedure6 is inapplicable.  Consequently, we 
will adhere to it.  
                     
6
.  Internal Operating Procedure 9.1, entitled Policy of Avoiding 
Intra-Circuit Conflict of Precedent, recites the following: 
 It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a 
 panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent 
 panels.  Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the 
holding 
 in a published opinion of a previous panel.  Court in 
 banc consideration is required to do so. 
  
   
   IV. Conclusion 
Yellow Freight's petition for review of the Board's Order finding 
a violation of Mendez's rights will be denied and the Board's 
order to that extent will be enforced.  So much of the Board's 
cross-application for enforcement of the Board's order based on 
Yellow Freight's violation of § 8(a)(1) will be denied.        
 ___________ 
 
